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1 Introduction
The practice of providing environmental performance and e±ciency related product informa-
tion to consumers { more popularly referred to as eco- or green labeling { has gained increas-
ing popularity in recent years. Products with labels promoting attributes like \recyclable",
\degradable" or \ozone-friendly" has °ooded the market along with eco-labeled products pro-
moting environmentally friendly process and production methods (PPMs) like \dolphin-safe
tuna", furniture made from wood harvested from sustainably managed forests and ¯sh from
sustainable ¯sheries. The popularity of eco-labeled products is primarily based on its market-
driven approach to achieve environmental goals. The increased concern of consumers for the
environment and food safety, re°ected by their willingness to pay relatively higher prices for
products that has been produced in an environmentally friendly manner provides a positive
incentive for producers to choose techniques that minimizes the adverse e®ects on the envi-
ronment and improves the quality of ¯nal products. As Table I indicates, the incidence of
both developed and developing countries that undertake voluntary labeling programs has risen
dramatically to keep pace with rising consumer demand for eco-friendly products over the last
decade.
The popularity of eco-labeling programs notwithstanding, the controversy about eco-
labeling lies in the di®erential impacts that such programs are alleged to have on market
access, and on the welfare of developing exporters and their developed counterparts. In partic-
ular, there are genuine concerns as to whether eco-labeling will o®set the expansion in world
trade achieved after decades of e®ort devoted to multilateral trade liberalization and whether
eco-labeling should be treated as a Trade Related Environmental Measure (TREM), and be
placed under the discipline of existing trade agreements | particularly, since the WTO, as
currently structured, does not explicitly discipline the use of eco-labels through the rules of
the WTO, nor does it require member nations to establish standards. Thus, whether or not
labeling-related environmental justi¯cations for the use of trade restricting policies should be
part of the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and / or Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS) has become a central issue in the ongoing negotiations amongst WTO members (Nord-
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1strÄom and Vaughan, 2000; WTO-CTE, 2000 and 1996) .
These observations constitute a new dimension to the North-South divide in the trade
and environment debate, and highlight how the promise of legitimate, market-based e®orts
to entice producer adoption of environmental conscious production techniques may con°ict
with trade interests. Speci¯cally, developing economies are concerned with the possible ma-
nipulation of green labeling standards as a non-tari® barrier in disguise. Meanwhile, countries
concerned with product safety and the growth of green consumerism may favor multilateral
trade agreements to move beyond traditional trade policies and cover product standard issues.
The tuna/dolphin dispute between the United States and Mexcio, and Austrian labeling of
2tropical timber are but two of the relatively high pro¯le cases in point .
It bears emphasis at the very outset that there are key di®erences between eco-labeling
and more traditional forms of environmental policies. Governments bound by commitments to
liberalize trade in the absence of environmental commitments may strategically lower emission
taxes to replace explicitly protectionist border taxes or export subsidies (Barrett, 1994; Ulph,
1996 and Kennedy, 1994) at the expense of an increase in domestic or transnational pollution.
Lax environmental standards and import barriers are thus (imperfect) substitutes in protecting
industries against competitive pressures from abroad. In this context, trade agreements that
encompass multilateral cooperation to avoid a \race-to-the-bottom" in environmental policies,
may prevent countries from undermining environmental performance in the name of trade (Bar-
3rett, 1990; and Nordaus and Yang, 1996) .
1A proposal to impose countervailing duties on imports produced under lax environmental standards has also
been raised in the United States (S 984, introduced by Senator David Boren in 1991).
2The Marine Mammal Protection Act in the United States prohibited imports of tuna from Mexico unless
the dolphin protection standards set out in the Act is met. The dispute panels decided in 1991 and 1994 in
favor of Mexico, on the grounds that (i) the import ban is based on the production and process methods of
the product (PPMs), and (ii) GATT's general exceptions including Article XX (which acknowledges the right
of individual nations in taking actions (including import restrictions) to protect human, plant life, health, and
the conservation of exhaustible resources), do not apply to measures intended to achieve the environmental
objectives beyond a nation's jurisdictions. Instead, the US introduced an eco-label scheme for \dolphin-safe"
tuna, which was recognized as being in conformance with GATT (Wright, 1996).
3Bagwell and Staiger (1997) examines the role of trade sanctions in eliciting cooperative behavior in a trade
agreement within a framework of repeated games.
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In contrast, there are at least four reasons why eco-labeling is di®erent both from an an-
alytical standpoint as well as in practice. These have to do with the way in which eco-labeling:
(i) takes advantage of green consumerism; (ii) induces voluntary adoption of eco-friendly pro-
duction techniques; (iii) gives rise to trade repercussions when labeling standards di®er across
trading partners, and (iv) constitutes yet another potential source for multilateral coordination
failures concerning the choise of labeling standards. To begin with, eco-labeling has the virtue
of allowing consumers to internalize the environmental consequences / product safety concerns
of their consumption decision making (Srinivasan, 1998; NordstrÄom and Vaughan, 2000 and
UNCTAD, 1995). These subjective preferences favoring eco-friendly products are re°ected in
market prices via a green premium, and allows discrimination between \like" products with dif-
4ferentiated environmental, health, or safety consequences. Second, the success of eco-labeling
hinges on voluntary producer adoption of eco-friendly production techniques in response to the
green premium. For example, at the industry level, reputation of a green pro¯le has been shown
to enable improvements in environmental performance and pro¯ts, even when the additional
costs of higher standards are taken into account (Repetto, 1995; Cohen and Fenn, 1997; Lanoie
et al. 1997; and Dasgupta et al. 1998). Third, concerns over eco-labeling arise precisely when
trade partners acknowledge these consumption and production (and hence, trade) consequences
of eco-labeling. In particular, it is not at all clear that a refusal to tap into green consumerism
via lax labeling standards can indeed substitute for trade / production subsidies.
Finally, even when labeling standards are manipulated to reap terms of trade gains and
to protect domestic interests in the name of the environment, the promise of eco-labeling as a
marketing device, as opposed to an implicit tax, makes it even more di±cult to apply traditional
\race-to-the-bottom" type coordination failure arguments when considering the potential e±-
ciency and redistribution consequences of international cooperation (UNCTAD 1995, Cameron
1998, Hoekman and Leidy 1992, and Hoekman and Koestaki 1995). As such, the presumption
that a environmental race to the bottom is inevitable remains to be shown in the context of
eco-labeling.
4See UNCTAD (1995) and Shams (1995) for survey results on consumers' willingness to pay of products
attached with an eco-label.
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In this paper, we construct a two-country (North and South) model, characterized by
asymmetries in consumer income, to explore the economic rationale behind the seemingly
complementary role of eco-labeling and import protection when the North (South) as a net im-
porter (exporter) of eco-friendly products. We consider three groups of decision makers in each
country | environmentally conscious consumers who prefers goods produced via eco-friendly
methods (Srinivasan 1995); producers who may voluntarily participate in an eco-labeling pro-
gram; and governments that are bound by an agreement to pursue free trade | and analyze
how the volume of trade is a®ected as a consequence of strategic competition between the two
governments on voluntary domestic producer adoption of eco-labeling standards.
First and foremost, we show that imperfectly informed consumption and production
decision making in the absence of eco-labeling has an inherent pro-trade bias. This market
failure occurs when consumers in high income countries wherein environmental standards are
high attach shadow prices to eco-friendly products that underestimate the actual utility gains.
Meanwhile, absent any means of identifying the environmental performance of ¯nal products,
the same shadow price overestimates the utility gains from eco-unfriendly products. The result-
ing volume of trade can be shown to strictly exceed that which apply under perfect information.
In this context, labeling should be viewed as a market-driven policy which corrects for this pro-
trade bias of imperfect information.
Quite distinct from the role of eco-labeling as a corrective device to improve consumer
information, strategic use of labeling opens up the possibility of a second round adverse impact
on market access. We show that when eco-labeling standards are manipulated in order to
reap terms of trade gains in a strategic environment, unilateral attempts to raise voluntary
labeling standards shift consumption expenditure in favor of the eco-friendly output and put
downward pressure on the price of eco-friendly products, or equivalently, the Southern terms of
trade. Multilateral coordination failure in the context of eco-labeling takes the form of labeling
standards that are set too high (low) in the importing North (exporting South) relative to the
Pareto Optimal benchmark. The result is a tari®-like volume of trade response, as the strategic
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choices of labeling standards shift the market share in favor of the importing North. It is thus
the choice of labeling standards in a non-cooperative environment, rather than the information
embodied in eco-labels per se, which constitute an important reason as to why eco-labeling
unnecessarily limits market access, to detriment of the welfare of Southern exporters. In order
to illustrate these ¯ndings, the paper concludes with the results of a numerical simulation,
based on which the implication of our ¯ndings in terms of multilateral cooperation in setting
eco-labeling standards are discussed.
2 The Model
We envisage a world with two countries (North (n) and South (s)), where di®erences in con-
sumer income constitute the source of comparative advantage. There are two goods: a ho-
i imogeneous numeraire commodity (y ), along with an output x , i = n; s. With eco-labeling,
producers are given the option to voluntarily adopt an environmentally sound production tech-
inique e > 1, or an eco-unfriendly technique e = 1, where e 2 (1;1) denotes the level of
environmental standard, or the intensity of pollution abatement in the production process.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the North is a net importer of x in general equi-
librium. We are interested in environment externalities of the producer-to-consumer variety,
in the sense that consumers derive utility from the consumption of good x based on both the
physical quantity of good x consumed and the eco-friendliness of the production process.
2.1 Production
i iTwo sectors y and x constitute the production side of the North and the South. Production
i i iof the numeraire y = L employs a resource input, L . Total endowment of resource input iny y
i s nthe two countries is given by L, of which country i's share is given by ¯ , with ¯ + ¯ = 1.
With mobility of input resources between the two sectors within each country, the economy-
wide price of input resources in units of the numeraire is thus unity in both the North and the
iSouth. Thus, ¯ L also denotes the total income in units of the numeraire that resource owners
can maximally devote to the consumption of the two goods.
There are a large number (N) of competitive producers engaged in the production of
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igood x in country i. Each individual producer is endowed with one unit of capital, that may
be invested in the production of x depending on the environmental standard to be adopted.
To focus on the decision-making problem with respect to the choice of production technique,
ithe production function of x is given by:
`i ix = x(e ) = minf1; g; ° > 1: (1)
i °(e ) b
iwhere ` denotes input resources employed in the production of x (e). ° parameterizes the cost
of adopting eco-friendly production technique. We assume that ° > 1 so that the unit cost
i ° i +of production (e ) b is increasing and strictly convex in e . b 2 [0; b ] denotes a ¯rm-speci¯c
technological parameter, and captures any heterogeneity among the N producers' access to
cost-e±cient production technologies. In addition, producers in both countries are uniformly
+distributed along the [0; b ] interval.
2.2 Green Consumption
i iThe utility of a representative consumer U(D ; d ) takes as arguments the consumption of thex y
i ihomogeneous numeraire d , along with an index of e®ective units of good x consumed, D ,y x
5with ,
i i i ilogU(D ; d ) = ® logD + (1¡ ®) log d ;x y x y
iwhere ® > 0 denotes the share of consumer expenditure devoted to good x. Let E be the set of
i n seco-friendly production techniques available to consumers in country i, where E = fe ; e ; 1g
iwith eco-labeling. d (e) is the demand for x associated with production technique e. Greenx
iconsumption, D , is thus given by:x X X X
i i i iD = d (e) + (e¡ 1)d (e) = ed (e): (2)x x x x
i i ie2E e2E e2E
iE®ective green consumption D thus consists of two components, and account for both thex
physical quantity of x consumed, along with the associated environmental standard adopted,P i( (e ¡ 1)d (e)). In particular, a unit increase in the consumption of good x producedi xe2E
via production technology e = 1 (e > 1) increases e®ective green consumption by exactly
5See Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) for a discussion of the use of similar utility indexes when product di®erentiation
is of central concern.
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(more than) one unit. In addition, the ratio e=¹e (> 1 whenever e > ¹e) denotes the marginal
i irate of substitution between d (e) and d (¹e) and re°ects consumer's valuation for eco-friendlyx x
production.
3 Pro-trade Bias of Information Asymmetry
3.1 Production Incentives under Imperfect Information
iIn the absence of labeling, producers are bound by environmental regulation to adopt e = ¹e .
Since consumers cannot di®erentiate between products based on ¯rms' choice of production
methods, a uniform price ¹p applies regardless of the eco-friendliness of the underlying produc-
6 i °tion process. A producer in country i with unit cost (¹e ) b makes positive pro¯ts if and only
if
¹pi ° i¹¹p ¸ (¹e ) b, b · b ´ :
i °(¹e )
i¹b represents the marginal producer in country i who is just indi®erent between exiting the
industry or not. Since producer pro¯ts are monotonically decreasing in b, producers in country
i¹i with b · b make positive pro¯ts. It follows that aggregate supply (in physical units) in the
n s¹ ¹two countries (X and X ) are given by:
N N ¹p N ¹pn n s¹¹ ¹X = b = · = X : (3)
+ + n ° + s °b b (¹e ) b (¹e )
n ° s ° nwhenever (¹e ) ¸ (¹e ) : Thus, international asymmetry in environmental regulations ¹e has
a direct, and negative bearing on the comparative advantage of the North, at constant world
price ¹p.
3.2 Consumption Decision under Imperfect Information
Pi i¹Let d = d (e) be the total physical units of x consumed. With imperfectly informedix xe2E
consumers, the (inverse) demand ¹p of good x depends only on quantity consumed in physical
units, with
6Clearly, with a uniform price,
° i °¹p¡ (e) b < ¹p¡ (¹e ) b
i iwhenever e > ¹e . As should be expected, voluntary supply of green production e is impossible in the absence
of price incentives.
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i i¹¹p = ®W =d ; (4)x
iwhere W is the amount of disposable income available to consumers in country i. Clearly, if
n s¹e > ¹e , consumption demand fail to reward Northern producers who undertake eco-friendly
i n i sproduction methods since the marginal rate of substitution between d (¹e ) and d (¹e ) exceedsx x
the relative market price of goods produced via eco-friendly, and eco-unfriendly means if and
n sonly if 1 = (¹p=¹p) < ¹e =¹e .
i i i¹Also denote ¸ (e) = d (e)=d as the fraction of x consumed in country i that is producedx x
s svia production technique e. Since the South is a net exporter, we have, ¸ (¹e ) = 1, as domestic
soutput (with standard ¹e is more than su±cient to satisfy domestic demand. Meanwhile,
n s n n¸ (¹e ) > 0 and ¸ (¹e ) > 0 as the North imports strictly positive amounts from the South. The
s i 7shadow price of Southern output (¹e ¼ ) in country i can therefore be expressed as
i i s@U =@d (¹e )x s i i= ¹e U =UD yxi@U=@dy
s¹e ¹ps i´ ¹e ¼ = · ¹p: (5)
i n n s s¸ (¹e )(¹e ¡ ¹e ) + ¹e
i n n s s nwhenever ¸ (¹e )(¹e ¡¹e ) ¸ 0. Thus, in the exporting South, where ¸ (¹e ) = 0, the shadow price
n nof Southern output is exactly equal to ¹p. Meanwhile, in the importing North, with ¸ (¹e ) > 0,
¹p overstates the shadow value of Southern outputs in the presence of incomplete consumer in-
n sformation whenever ¹e > ¹e .
i i n i nSimilarly, the shadow price of Northern output is given by (U =U )¹e = ¼ ¹e . As such,yDx
n¹e ¹pi n¹p¡ ¼ ¹e = ¹p¡
n n s s¸(¹e )(¹e ¡ ¹e ) + ¹e
7To see this, note that
i i s@U =@d (¹e )x s i i s i= ¹e U =U ´ ¹e ¼D yxii@U =@dy
i ii ¹¹pd =d®=D x ys x s= ¹e = ¹e
i i i(1¡ ®)=d D =dy x y
¹ps= ¹e
i n n s s¸ (¹e )(¹e ¡ ¹e ) + ¹e
where the second equality follows since ® and 1¡® are respectively the consumer's expenditure share on x and
iy, and the third equality follows from the de¯nition of ¸ (e).
8
i n n s(¸ (¹e )¡ 1)(¹e ¡ ¹e )
= ¹p · 0 (6)
n n s s¸(¹e )(¹e ¡ ¹e ) + ¹e
n s i nas long as ¹e > ¹e and (1 ¡ ¸ (¹e )) > 0: Thus, ¹p understates the shadow value of Northern
outputs.
Proposition 1 summarizes these observations, by accouting for producer incentives as
summarized in equation (3), together with the relationship between shadow and market price
as in equations (4) - (6),
n sProposition 1 With information asymmetry, and ¹e > ¹e :
n n n n n s@U =@d (¹e ) @U =@d (¹e )x xn n ° n n s s ° s n¹ ¹b (¹e ) = ¹p < ¹e ¼ = ; b (¹e ) = ¹p > ¹e ¼ = :
n n n n@U =@d @U =@dy y
In addition,
s s s@U =@d (¹e )xs s ° s s¹b (¹e ) = ¹p = ¹e ¼ = :
s s@U =@dy
Proposition 1 highlights the potential for con°ict of interests between the North and the
South in environmental regulatory debate when consumer information is imperfect, and when
existing environmental standards in the two countries di®er. Speci¯cally, Northern producers
who are bound by stricter environmental standards receive a price that is strictly less than
n nthe shadow value that Northern consumers attach to their products (¹p < ¼ ¹e ). In addition,
Northern consumers pay a price that is strictly higher then their shadow value of Southern
s nexports (¹p > ¹e ¼ ).
For precisely these reasons, the absence of eco-labeling has a pro-trade bias, in the sense
n n °¹that the unit cost of production incurred by the marginal producer in the North b (¹e ) is
strictly less than the shadow value that Northern consumers attach to Northern outputs. In
s s °¹contrast, the marginal cost of production incurred by the Southern marginal producer b (¹e )
is strictly higher than Northern consumers' shadow valuation. In the context of our discussion
regarding the entry and exit decisions of producers, where the marginal producer is given by
ib = ¹p , Proposition 1 thus implies that there is an excessive number of Northern producers1
exiting from the industry once international trade opens up, and too many Southern producers
operate at costs above shadow value.
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3.3 Market Access and Information Asymmetry
To con¯rm the role of information asymmetry on market access when environmental standards
in the two countries di®er, note that market access can be determined in general equilibrium
by accounting for product market clearance between the North and the South. Speci¯cally,
n s ¡ ¢®(W +W ) N ¹p N ¹psn¹ ¹= X +X = +
+ n ° + s °¹p b (¹e ) b (¹e )
We assume, in addition, that monitoring environmental standard is costly. Thus, let M(e)
be the cost, in units of the numeraire, required to establish and monitor standard e. M(e) is
assumed to be strictly increasing and convex in the level of labeling standard to be adopted e,
0 i i i¹withM(1) =M (1) = 0. Thus, gross disposable income in country i is given byW = ¹pX +y ,
with Z i¹ 2bN N ¹pi i i ° i i iy = L ¡ (¹e ) bdb¡M (¹e ) = L ¡ ¡M(¹e ); (7)
+ + i °b 2b (¹e )0
iwhere the second equality follows from equation (3). The cost of monitoring M(¹e ) is borne
iby the government in country i, and a lump sum tax of the amount M (¹e ) on consumers and
producers balances the government budget constraint.
The uniform market price ¹p, as given by product and input market clearance (equations (7)
and (8)), thus solves
µ ¶¡1X® N ¹p N ¹pi i¹p = (L ¡M (¹e )) + : (8)® + n ° + s °1¡ b (¹e ) b (¹e )2 i=n;s
sLet the market share of the South ¹s be given byp
s¹Xs n s n n s¹s (¹e ; ¹e ) = = 1¡ ¹s (¹e ; ¹e ): (9)p pn s¹ ¹X +X
It can be readily veri¯ed that the volume of trade between the North and the South (in units
of the numeraire) can be expressed as:
s s s s n s s n¹¹pX ¡ ®W = ®(¹s ¡ ¯ )L+ ®[¹s M(¹e )¡ ¹s M(¹e )]: (10)p p p
Thus, when both countries adopt the baseline eco-unfriendly production standard, with
n s¹e = ¹e = 1, a necessary and su±cient condition for the South to be a net exporter is that
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sSouthern producer market share ¹s is greater than Southern share of consumption incomep
sderived from resource ownership ¯ . Clearly, the volume of trade is increasing in the producer
smarket share of the South, and decreasing in her consumption income share ¯ . Finally, since
ioutput in country i is strictly decreasing in ¹e , we have the following result:
Proposition 2 1. In the presence of information asymmetry, raising environmental stan-
dard in the North (South) always increases (decreases) the volume of trade if the marginal
0 icost of monitoring M (¹e ) is su±ciently small.
2. Under the same condition, the uniform market price ¹p is increasing in environmental
istandard ¹e , i = n; s.
Proof: See Appendix A.
nSince an increase in ¹e (i) increases Southern market share, and (ii) decreases total
Northern disposable income as the cost of monitoring increases, strict environmental standard
in the North unambiguously increases the volume of North-South trade whenever the market
n sshare e®ect dominates. It can be readily shown that so long as ¯ is greater than ¯ , a higher
product standard in the North relative to the South is not only intuitively plausible, but can
8in fact be the outcome of unilateral welfare maximization of the two countries.
Summarizing our observations so far, stricter environmental standards in the North with
information asymmetry drives a wedge between shadow valuation of green consumption and the
uniform market price (Proposition 1). Thus, the subsequent failure on the part of producers to
equate unit cost to shadow valuations implies that even though consumers are environmentally
conscious, raising environmental standards in the North can only increase the total volume
of eco-unfriendly imports from the South! Indeed, Propositions 1 and 2 combined imply that
that raising environmental standards in the North encourages entry of Southern producers, as
s n¹b = ¹p is strictly increasing in ¹e , but induces exit of Northern producers. For consumers, higher
environmental standards come at the cost of a higher price ¹p. We turn next to examine the
role of eco-labeling in determining the market access consequences of environmental standards.
8A more detailed proof of this relegated to Appendix A.
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4 Trade with Eco-labeling
4.1 Production Incentives and Standards with Eco-labeling
Consider now the incentives to adopt high environment standards in the presence of eco-
labeling. Producers solve a simple two-stage problem, involving the decision of (i) whether
to remain in or exit the industry and (ii) whether to voluntarily adopt the environmentally
Isound technology e > 1 or the eco-unfriendly technique e = 1. We begin with the second
stage problem.
Let p(e) denote the label-speci¯c price of output produced using production techniques e,
ia producer in country i strictly bene¯ts from voluntarily adopting the clean technology e > 1
9if and only if
ip(e )¡ p(1)i i ° ip(e )¡ (e ) b ¸ p(1)¡ b, b · ´ b : (11)ei °(e ) ¡ 1
ib thus singles out the marginal producer who is just indi®erent between adopting the eco-e
i i °friendly labeling standard, or the eco-unfriendly technology. Note that b ((e ) ¡ 1) measurese
ithe additional resource cost of producing one more unit of x (e) by the marginal producer,
iwhile p(e ) ¡ p(1) represents the marginal revenue gains from doing so. Clearly, as long as
ip(e ) > p(1), relatively low cost producers (with relative low unit cost b) are favorably selected
10in the set of eco-friendly producers .
i i +Equation (11) yields the supply schedule of voluntary green-production X = b N=b ,e e
i iwith X ¸ 0 if and only if p(e )¡ p(1) ¸ 0. Turning now to the ¯rst stage, note that producerse
who adopt the status quo technology makes positive pro¯ts if and only if
ib · p(1) ´ b : (12)1
ib thus represents the cost parameter of the marginal producer who is just indi®erent between1
i iproducing positive output or exiting the industry. It follows from the de¯nitions of b and be 1
9The commitment to improve environmental standard is backed by third party monitoring, the cost of which
is paid for by government sponsorship.
10This is in accordance with studies that demonstrate a bias in the cost of meeting environmental standards
against small and medium sized enterprises (WTO-CTE, July 1996).
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ithat the supply of good x produced via the baseline eco-unfriendly technology X is given by1
i i(b ¡b )Ne 111 .+b
Thus, international trade in the presence of eco-labeling yields production levels that are
igiven once label speci¯c prices p(e ) and p(1) are determined. We now turn to examine how
iconsumer valuation of environmental standards impact market prices p(e ) and p(1).
4.2 Consumer Decision under Eco-labeling
In the presence of credible third party monitoring, labeled (unlabeled) products originating
ifrom country i are synonymous with products that are made via production technology e = e
(e = 1). Meanwhile, international arbitrage implies that the price of like products are equalized
across the two countries. It follows, therefore, that consumers maximize utility by consuming
positive quantities of goods with the lowest cost per unit green consumption. In other words,
demand is positive for both labeled and unlabeled products, originating from the North and
the South if and only if
n sp(e ) p(e )
= = p(1): (13)
n se e
s iIn addition, shadow price of the eco-friendly Southern output in country i, e ¼ (i = n; s), is
given by
i i s i@U =@d (e ) ®=Dx xs i se ¼ = = e
i i i@U =@d (1¡ ®)=dy yP Pi i s i ip(e)d (e)=D p(e ) ed (e)=Di ix x x xe2E e2Es s= e = = p(e ): (14)
i i i id =d d =dy y y y P i iwhere the last equality follows from equation (qe) above, and ed (e) = D . Thus,ie2E x x
international trade in x guarantees that
s n s s se ¼ = p(e ) = e ¼ ; (15)
11 i i i i °Note that b · b , since (e ¡ 1)=((e ) ¡ 1) < 1: Thus, producers who voluntarily adopt the eco-friendlye 1
itechnology also makes positive pro¯ts since for producers with b · b ,e
i i ° ip(e )¡ (e ) b ¸ p(1)¡ b ¸ p(1)¡ b = 0:1
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and eco-labeling in the presence of free trade implies that the shadow price of Southern output
in the two countries are equal. Similar reasoning yields:
n n n n se ¼ = p(e ) = e ¼ ; (16)
and international trade with eco-labeling equalizes the shadow price of eco-friendly Northern
output in the two countries. Finally, the price of the eco-unfriendly output produced in either
icountry, is derived by substituting e = 1 in equations (15) and (16) above. Speci¯cally,
i¼ = p(1): (17)
Thus, the shadow price of a unit of green consumption (¼) is given exactly by p(1). Taken
together, these observations imply that consumers pay a label-speci¯c green premium,
n i n i s i s¼ e ¡ ¼ p(e )¡ p(1) ¼ e ¡ ¼i= = e ¡ 1 = ; i = n; s:
n s¼ p(1) ¼
It follows, therefore, that the marginal rate of substitution between outputs produced in the
n s n s n stwo countries (e =e ) is equal to the corresponding relative market price p(e )=p(e ) = e =e .
In addition, the shadow price of both Southern and Northern outputs in the two countries
relative to the homogeneous numeraire is equal to their respective relative market prices, since
i s n¼ e = p(e); e = fe ; e ; 1g, in countries i = n; s. Further, making use of the producer responses
in the presence of eco-labeling (equations (11) and (12)), we have,
Proposition 3 With eco-labeling,
i ip(1) = ¼ = b ; i = n; s:1
In addition,
i i i i °p(e )¡ p(1) = p(1)(e ¡ 1) = b ((e ) ¡ 1); i = n; s:e
Thus, eco-labeling gives rise to entry and exit decisions that are based on consumers' marginal
valuation of eco-unfriendly production methods. In addition, the marginal resource costs re-
quired to produce eco-friendly products in the two countries are equated to their corresponding
green premia.
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4.3 Market Access and Eco-labeling
To determine the price of eco-unfriendly products in general equilibrium, note that product
market clearance requires that total consumption expenditure on x is equal to aggregate pro-
ducer revenue, thus: X X X
n s i i i i i i i®(W +W ) = p(e )X + p(1)X = p(1) (X e +X ) ´ p(1) X (18)e 1 e 1
i=n;s i=n;s i=n;s
where the third equality follows as consumers equate the marginal rate of substitution between
i i i i id (e ) and d (1) with the relative market price p(e )=p(1). In addition, X denotes country i'sx x
e®ective green output, where Ã !
i 2N (e ¡ 1)i i i iX ´ X e +X = p(1) + 1 (19)e 1 + i °b (e ) ¡ 1
where the second equality follows from the equations (11) and (12). We thus have,
iLemma 1 In the presence of eco-labeling, e®ective green output in country i (X ) is strictly
iincreasing in e , i = n; s if ° < 2.
Proof: See Appendix B.
iThe intuition of the above result is straightforward. Recall from the de¯nition of X
i(equation (11)) that an increase in e has the direct e®ect of raising the environmental stan-
idard per unit labeled output. Meanwhile, an increase in e also raises the cost of production,
and induces eco-friendly producers to adopt eco-unfriendly production methods (an increase
i iin X , but a reduction in X ). It follows that the former e®ect dominates whenever ° is su±-e1
ciently small.
In the sequel, we will assume throughout that the condition on ° in lemma 1 is satis¯ed,
iso that total e®ective green production is increasing in e . Indeed, we show in section 4.2 that
unless this is the case, raising voluntary labeling standard can never bene¯t environmentally
conscious consumers.
Note that gross disposable income in country i is given by
i i i i i i iW = p(e )X + p(1)X + y = p(1)X + y ;e 1
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where Ã !Z Zi ib be 1Ni i i ° iy = ¯ L ¡ (e ) bdb+ bdb ¡M(e )
+ ib 0 beÃ !
2 i 2N ¹p (e ¡ 1)i i= ¯ L ¡ ( + 1) ¡M (e ); (20)
+ i °b 2 (e ) ¡ 1
where the second equality follows from equations (11) and (12). Making use of the de¯nition
iof X , and upon rearranging terms, the shadow price of green consumption ¼ = p(1) in general
equilibrium is given by:
P i i(L ¡M(e ))® i=n;s
p(1) = : (21)® n s1¡ X +X2
Thus, the price of eco-unfriendly products, p(1), is inversely related to total e®ective green
n soutput in the two countries X +X .
Market access in general equilibrium can now be obtained by noting ¯rst that the market
sshare of the South s given byp
sXs s n n s ns (e ; e ) = = 1¡ s (e ; e );p pn sX +X
while Southern revenue in excess of consumption expenditure is expressed as:
s s s s s s s sp(e )X + p(1)X ¡ ®W = p(1)(X e +X )¡ ®We 1 e 1
s s= p(1)X ¡ ®W
s s n s s n= ®(s ¡ ¯ )L+ ®[s M(e )¡ s M(e )]: (22)p p p
Therefore, key to the determination of market access is once again the Southern market
i ishare. Since e®ective green output X , and hence s , is increasing in the voluntary labelingp
istandard e , we have,
Proposition 4 1. In the presence of eco-labeling, raising voluntary labeling standard in the
North (South) always decreases (increases) the volume of trade if the marginal cost of
0 imonitoring M (e ) is not too high.
2. Under the same condition, the price of eco-unfriendly products is strictly decreasing in
ie , i = n; s:
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Proof: See Appendix B.
To see this, note from lemma 1 that stricter voluntary labeling standards in the North
increases the aggregate supply of e®ective green production. Thus, raising labeling standards
in the North drives a wedge between the market price of eco-friendly Northern products and
eco-unfriendly Southern imports via the green premium. The result is a tari®-like outcome,
nwherein the terms of trade of the South p(1) decreases with e . Meanwhile, the volume of trade
ialso declines, as higher labeling standard shifts the market share (s ) in favor of the North.p
Thus, part (ii) of Proposition 4 shows that raising labeling standards in the North induces exit
i nof eco-unfriendly producers in both the North and the South, as b = p(1) is decreasing in e .1
A natural question that arises, however, is that since consumers' relative preference for
eco-friendly products is already re°ected in the green premium, how may consumer welfare
vary when the voluntary labeling standard rise even further in either country? To this end,
ipart (ii) of Proposition 4 provides the basis for a consumer welfare gain upon an increase in e ,
even after the increase in the green premium is accounted for. Indeed, since the price premium
attached to eco-friendly products is given by
n sp(e ) p(e )
= = p(1);
n se e
n sp(e ) p(e )it must be the case the price that consumers pay per unit green consumption, = =n se e
i ip(1), is also strictly decreasing in e ; i = n; s, since p(1) is strictly decreasing in e from
12Proposition 4.
5 How green should the labels be?
We have shown that stricter labeling standard in the North can behave in a manner similar
to an import barrier, and lowers the trade volume while worsening the Southern terms of
trade. What remains to be shown, therefore, is whether the incentives are indeed right for
the two countries to select asymmetric environmental standards that give rise to a de facto
import barrier in the presence of eco-labeling. To this end, we proceed to endogenize the
12 i i ®Speci¯cally, the indirect utility function of resource owners in country i is given by V = ¯ L=p(1) . Propo-c
i isition 4 thus implies that V is strictly increasing in e .c
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choice of standards in the North and the South. This is done by examining the nature of Nash
competition between the two countries in their choice of labeling standards and comparing
this result to the Pareto-Optimal benchmark. To make the strategic use of standards in the
market share rivalry of the two countries as transparent as possible, we focus on North-South
iinteraction based on di®erences in resource endowment (¯ ).
5.1 The Pareto Optimal Benchmark
We now turn to a comparison of the equilibrium provision of eco-friendly products illustrated
above, with the Pareto Optimal benchmark. In particular, consider a planner's problem, involv-
i iing the maximization of the welfare of country i, U(D ; d ), by choice of a pair of eco-friendlyx y
n s i i~ ~standards e ; e for countries n and s, a pair of producer allocations fb ; b g for countrye 1PO PO
i n i s i i~ ~ ~ ~i, as well as the consumption allocations fd (e ); d (e ); d (1); d )g in the two countries,x x x yPO PO
subject to:
j j j¹U(D ; d ) ¸ U ;x y
and the material balance restriction in equation (18). In addition, consumption allocations in
the two countries are subject to production constraints, with
n s n s~ ~d + d · y + y ;y y
n i s i i~ ~ ~d (e ) + d (e ) · X ; i = n; s;x x eX
n s i~ ~ ~d (1) + d (1) · X :x x 1
i=n;s
13We have the following result:
Proposition 5 Pareto Optimal allocation of resources and consumption in the two countries,
i = n; s satisfy:
n i i s i~¼ e = ~¼e = ~¼ e ; (23)PO PO PO
i~~¼ = b ; (24)1
i i i °~~¼(e ¡ 1) = b ((e ) ¡ 1); (25)PO e POZ i~beNi i °¡1 0 i~~¼X = b°(e ) db¡M (e ): (26)e PO PO+ ¡b b
13See Appendix for details.
18
i i iwhere ¼ = U =U denotes the shadow price of e®ective green consumption in country i.yDx
Proof: See Appendix B.
As should be expected, Pareto Optimality requires that consumers in both countries
attach the same shadow price to eco-friendly products originating from the North, and also to
eco-friendly products originating from the South (equation (23)). But this is exactly what would
be the case under eco-labeling (equations (13) - (15)). The next two conditions (equations (24)
and (25)) require that the marginal eco-unfriendly producer equate his unit cost of production
to the shadow price ~¼, and the marginal eco-friendly producer to equate the green premium
to the increment in unit production costs. Again, this corresponds to the market response to
eco-labeling as Proposition 2 illustrates. We have,
Corollary 1 If the choice of voluntary eco-labeling standards in the North and the South coin-
n scides with fe ; e g, the allocation of productive resources and consumption across countriesPO PO
is Pareto Optimal.
What remains to be shown, therefore, is whether the pair of Pareto Optimal standards can be
achieved under eco-labeling. Speci¯cally, equation (26) requires that environmental standards
i i~be set such that the shadow value of an increase in e , ~¼X , be equal to the marginal resourcee
~R ib+ i °¡1 0 ieand monitoring costs of doing so (N=b ) °(e ) bdb¡M (e ) in country i.0 PO PO
Thus, equation (18) shows that income asymmetries between the North and the South
alone is not su±cient to justify North-South asymmetries in labeling standards, in fact,
iCorollary 2 If resource endowment ¯ constitute the only di®erence between the North and
n sthe South, Pareto Optimality prescribes a pair of harmonized standards, e = e .PO PO
Corrollary 2 is of interest for two reasons. First, since the common shadow value of
e®ective green consumption in the two countries is given by ¼ when free trade and eco-labeling
prevail, Pareto Optimality requires that both countries adopt the same labeling standard pro-
vided that consumer income is the only di®erence between the North and the South. Second,
Corollary 2 also singles out the informational role of eco-labeling, when labeling standards are
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not manipulated in the name of market share rivalry between the two countries, and green
consumerism does not impinge on Southern comparative advantage simply because there exist
international di®erences in costs of complying to higher environmental standards that unam-
n s n sbiguously favor the North. Speci¯cally, note that if e = e , and ¯ > ¯ constitutes thePO PO
only di®erence between the North and the South, the volume of trade between the two countries
is given, via equation (22), by:
s s n s n s n s s s n n®(s (e ; e )¡ ¯ )L+ ®[s (e ; e )M(e )¡ s (e ; e )M(e )]p PO PO p PO PO PO p PO PO PO
s s n s n= ®(s (1; 1)¡ ¯ )L+ ®[s (1; 1)¡ s (1; 1)]M(e )p p p PO
s s= ®(s (1; 1)¡ ¯ )Lp
n swhere the second equality follows from the pair of common labeling standards e = e , andPO PO
s s n n s n s n n ssince s (e ; e ) = s (e ; e ) = s (1; 1) = s (1; 1) whenever e = e . Thus, the higherp p p pPO PO PO PO
environmental standard made possible by eco-labeling alone yields exactly the same volume of
trade as would be the case when both countries adopt the baseline eco-unfriendly production
process.
5.2 Non-cooperative Labeling Standards
We now return to a non-cooperative setting, and compare the Pareto Optimal labeling stan-
dards to the Nash equilibrium outcome when the two countries compete in choosing the intensi-
ties of the voluntary environmental standards to be certi¯ed by eco-labels. International trade
summarized by equations (11) - (22) above determine payo®s to consumers and producers in
14the two countries. The objective function of country i is given by the indirect utility function :
iWi s nV (e ; e ) = · ; (27)
®(p(1))
14 iV is just the sum of the indirect utility functions of producers in the two sectors, along with resource input
®owners in country i, de°ated by a (shadow) price index ¼ . To see this, note that since ® is the share of consumer
income on x, we have, X X
i i i®W = p(e)d (e) = p(1)d (e)e:x x
i ie2E e2EP
i i i i iIt follows that D = d (e)e = ®W =p(1). In addition, d = (1¡®)W as consumers devote 1¡® fractionx i x ye2E
i iof their income on y. Equation (33) thus follows from by substituting D and d into the utility function.x y
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® 1¡® iwhere · = ® (1¡®) andW , to recall, denotes gross national product. Taking as given the
jNash equilibrium labeling standard of country j, e , country i maximizes national welfare byNE
i 15setting e , with
i s ndV (e ; e ) ¸ 0
ideZ i ibeN ®W @p(1)i i °¡1 0 i i, p(1)X ¡ b°(e ) bdb¡M (e ) + (X ¡ ) ¸ 0 (28)e NE NE+ ib p(1) @e0
Thus, the welfare consequences of an increase in Southern labeling standard is composed of
s ithree distinct e®ects. First, an increase in e raises producer revenue by p(1)X in the presencee
of labeling. Such gains in producer revenues are achieved at an additional resource cost of
iR i °¡1b b°(e ) 0 ie db, along with an additional monitoring expense M (e ). Of course, up till here,+0 NEb
iSouthern government's evaluation of the net marginal bene¯ts of raising e is exactly the same
as that of the Pareto Optimal outcome, precisely since the market price p(1) correctly measures
the shadow value of green consumption ¼.
Where non-cooperative behavior and Pareto Optimality di®ers turns out to be a terms
i i iof trade e®ect (X ¡ ®W =p(1))(@p(1)=@e ). In particular, since p(1) is strictly decreasing
iin e from Proposition 2, the terms of trade e®ect is strictly negative (positive) if and only
i®Wiif X > (·) , or equivalently, if and only if country i is a net exporter (importer). Inp(1)
particular, from equation (21), we have
i@p(1) p(1) @X
= > 0:
i s n i@e 2(X +X ) @e
i iMaking use of the de¯nition of b and X and rearranging terms, we have,e e
i s n i@V (e ; e ) @X ®=2i i i i 0 i¸ 0 , (1 + s ¡ s ) ¡ (1 + (s ¡ s ))M (e ) ¸ 0 (29)p c p ci i@e @e 1¡ ®=2
i i s nwhere s ´W =(W +W ) denotes the share of country i's consumption expenditure.c
15See the Appendix for a proof of these results.
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As asserted in the discussion of lemma 1 above, therefore, a necessary condition for
icountry i; i = n; s to set voluntary labeling standard e that strictly exceeds the baseline eco-
i iunfriendly level, is that total e®ective green outut X in country i is increases with e .
Furthermore, equations (20) and (21) reveal that the terms of trade e®ect constitutes the
sole source of con°ict of interest between the importing North and the exporting South, and
guides the two countries to deviate from the Pareto Optimal of labeling standards in opposite
directions. In sum, we have
Proposition 6 With eco-labeling,
s n1. e > 1 and e > 1.NE NE
2. The exporting South underestimates, while the importing North overestimates the bene¯ts
of raising voluntary labeling standard relative to the Pareto Optimal benchmark , with
n s n@V (e ; e ) j ¸ 0; (30)iie =es NE@e
s n s@V (e ; e ) j · 0: (31)iie =en NE@e
Thus, Nash equilibrium labeling standards constitute neither a race to the bottom, nor a race
to the top, in the sense that the strategic incentives guiding the two countries in a Nash equi-
librium are diametrically opposite to each other.
More importantly, these strategic incentives imply an important reason as to why eco-
labeling has perverse volume of trade consequences. In particular, high voluntary labeling
standards in the North shifts the relative producer market share in favor of the North, while
low labeling standards in the South simply reinforces the market share shifting consequences
of strategic interaction between the two countries. This implies, from Proposition 6, that
uncoordinated competition in labeling standards yields an equilibrium trade volume that is
strictly less than the Pareto Optimal benchmark.
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6 An Example
As an illustration, we present in Table 2 the result of a numerical simulation based on equa-
tions (1), (2) and (11) - (22) of the model. The results show the relationship between the Nash
equilibrium choice of labeling standards and the Pareto Optimal when income asymmetry is
16the only source of comparative advantage between the North and the South. Our choice
of parameter values essentially normalize the status-quo world price p(1) to unity when both
countries adopt eco-unfriendly production methods. The simulation results show that:
Labeling Standards: In the Pareto Optimal benchmark, the joint welfare of the two countries
requires both countries to employ the same labeling standard (Corollary 2). This is in contrast
s nto the Nash Equilibrium outcome with eco-labeling, wherein e (= 1:35) < e (= 1:508)NE NE
(Proposition 6).
Price E®ects: Focussing on equilibrium labeling standards under Nash competition, note
that with both the North and the South raising green production relative to the status quo,
the price of eco-unfriendly products decreases (Proposition 4). Meanwhile, the price of labeled
products originating from both the North and the South increases via the label-speci¯c green
premia.
n sProducer Pro¯ts and Market Shares: Since e > e in the Nash equilibrium, aggre-NE NE
gate producer pro¯ts increase in the North, and decrease in the South relative to the status
quo. The result obtains even though the North has no inherent advantage in producing green
output, and North-South di®erence in consumer income constitutes the only source of compar-
ative advantage. Meanwhile, in the Pareto Optimal benchmark, symmetric labeling standards
implies that the market shares of producers in the two countries do not change. However, the
increase in production costs induces exit and lowers aggregate pro¯ts in both countries relative
to the status quo.
16We take the following parameters characterizing the North and the South as given: ° = 1:2 and satis¯es
+ 3the conditions given in lemma 1. In addition, N=b = 1 and the cost of monitoring is given by :5(e¡ 1) . The
consumption share ® is 0:2.
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National Welfare: In terms of national welfare, the simulation results show that the South
unambiguously loses while the North is strictly better o® if terms of trade gains can be achieved
via an all out competition in labeling standards relative to the status-quo (Propositions 5 and 6).
Figure 1 illustrates these results by explicitly plotting best-response and iso-welfare func-
tions as given by equations (30) and (31). The e±cient choice of labeling standards (equation
(26)) based on the Pareto Optimal benchmark are illustrated by the pair of solid lines while
the pair of dotted lines are the best-response functions. The family of inverted U-shaped iso-
welfare contours in dotted lines correspond to the welfare of the South successively when the
s n s npair of labeling standards are given by (1; 1), (e ; e ), and (e ; e ). Note that the SouthPO PO NE NE
is better o® whenever the North lowers labeling standards. Hence, downward shifts of the
iso-welfare contours indicate an increase in Southern welfare. Meanwhile, the second family of
iso-welfare contours in solid lines depicts the welfare of the North successively when the pair of
s n s nlabeling standards are given by (e ; e ), and (e ; e ). As should be apparent, the twoPO PO NE NE
countries are jointly better o® choosing the pair of Pareto Optimal labeling standards relative
to the Nash equilibrium benchmark, although the South is better o® still if both countries
s nadopt the status-quo eco-unfriendly production methods (with e = 1; e = 1), as the Southern
iso-welfare contour evaluated at the Pareto Optimal labeling standards lies above the point
s ne = e = 1.
Volume of Trade: Table 2 also reports the trade volume consequences of Nash competition
in environmental standards between the two countries with eco-labeling. Note that the volume
of trade falls in the presence of eco-labeling compared to the status quo, as the asymmetric
Nash labeling standards shift producer market share in favor of the North, and unambiguously
lower the volume of trade. These results reiterate our conclusion in Propositions 2, and show
that the perverse market access implications of eco-labeling based on North-South market share
rivalry is indeed a Nash equilibrium outcome. In comparison to the Pareto Optimal benchmark,
what is notable is that a deterioration in market access from the status quo is indeed not an
inevitable consequence of eco-labeling. Indeed, trade volume remains strictly una®ected when
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the two countries choose labeling standards that maximize their joint welfare.
7 Conclusion
This paper examined has the nature of Nash competition between importing and exporting
countries in the choice of environment related product labeling standard. We ¯nd that the
absence of eco-labeling has a pro-trade bias, whenever high income importing countries use
higher product standards. In this context, the ¯rst round trade volume impact of eco-labeling
should more appropriately be viewed as a corrective device, which remedies consumer informa-
tion imperfection.
By explicitly taking product labeling standards as endogenously determined by Nash
competition between the two countries, however, we ¯nd that the trade volume impact of eco-
labeling may be even larger, particularly when the distribution of disposable consumer income
between the two countries is su±ciently unequal. These results can be attributed to the obser-
vations that eco-labeling leads to opposing incentives on the part of the two countries, so that
net exporting countries of eco-unfriendly products may refrain from strict product standards in
order to avoid a deterioration in terms of trade. Meanwhile, importing countries overestimate
the gains from labeling as they do not internalize the terms of trade losses borne by the export-
ing country. Thus, eco-labeling may create new distortions unless international cooperation in
labeling standards are taken seriously.
In addition, our results show that labeling may have adverse income distributional conse-
quences that fall disproportionately on resource-poor countries. The framework set out in this
paper thus sets the stage for understanding the nature of coordination failure between countries
in terms of their choice of labeling standards in the presence of environmentally conscious con-
sumption behavior, along with the income redistribution consequences of environmental policies
17in the absence of North-South cooperation in trade related environmental policy-making .
17See, for instance, Abrego, Perroni, Whalley and Wigle (1997) and Nordhaus and Yang (1996) study North-
South bargaining when Northern consumers attach existence value to environmental assets that are not revealed
in the product pricing.
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Appendix A
Welfare optimal product standards in the Absence of eco-labeling
s s n s s ® sThe indirect utility function of the South is given by V (¹e ; ¹e ) =W [¹e =¹p] , whereW denotes
Southern gross national income as de¯ned in equation (7). We have:¯ Ã Z s¹¯s s b¹@V ®W N¯ s °¡1 s 0 s¸ 0, ¡ °(¹e ) bdb¡m M (¹e )¯
s s +¯@¹e ¹e b 0s¹e =1 ¶s®W @¹ps¹ s+ (¹pX ¡ ) j ¸ 0¹e =1s¹p @¹e
s sThere are thus three e®ects in play. ®W =¹e denotes the direct marginal bene¯t of an increaseR s¹bNs s °¡1in standards ¹e . The resource and monitoring costs of raising standards are °(¹e ) bdb¡+ 0b
0 sM (¹e )]. Raising standards also implies a terms of trade gains. Making use of the de¯nition of
s s¹ ¹b and X and simplifying, we obtain:
s¹s (°=2¡ 1)ps s s¹e = 1, ¯ ¡ ¹s ¸ :NE p s(1¡ ®=2)(1¡ °¹s =2)p
s sThus, if (i) the share of resource in the South ¯ , and hence W , is su±ciently small, (ii) the
scost of raising standard, as given by ° is large, or if (iii) the market share of the South ¹s isp
large enough, the South will optimally choose to produce only eco-unfriendly products.
n s nIn a similar fashion, the indirect utility function of the North is given by V (¹e ; ¹e ) =
n n s s n n ®W [(¸ (¹e )(¹e ¡ ¹e ) + ¹e )=¹p] , we have
n¹s (°=2¡ 1)pn n n¹e 1, ¯ ¡ ¹s ¸ :> p n(1¡ al=2)(1¡ °¹s =2)p
i i s s¹ ¹ ¹Volume of Trade Let − ´ X =¹p. From the de¯nition of X , and W , the volume of trade
as given by equation (10) can be as
®s s 2 s s s¹ ¹¹pX ¡ ®W = (1¡ )¹p − ¡ ®(¯ L ¡M(¹e ))
2
s¹−s n s 0 s= ®(L ¡M(¹e )¡M(¹e )) ¡ ®(¯ L ¡M (¹e ))¹ ¹−+ −
s s n s s n= ®(¹s ¡ ¯ )L+ ®[¹s M(¹e )¡ ¹s M(¹e )]p p p
which gives equation (10) in the text.
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Proof of Proposition 2: 1. From equation (10) in the text, we have,
ss s¹ @¹s¹pX ¡ ®W ps n s 0 n= (L¡M(¹e )¡M (¹e )) ¡ ®¹s M (¹e ) > 0pn n@¹e @¹e
s °1=(¹e )0 n s nif M (¹e ) is not too large, since ¹s = is strictly increase in ¹e . The volume ofs ° n °p 1=(¹e ) +1=(¹e )
strade impact of an increase in ¹e can be similarly ascertained.
2. In addition, making use of equation (8), it can be readily veri¯ed that
s 2 0 s°¹s@¹p ¹p ¹p M (¹e )p
= ¡ > 0
s s s n@¹e 2 ¹e L¡M(¹e )¡M(¹e )
0 nif M (¹e ) is su±ciently small.
Appendix B
i iLet − ´ X =p(1), be the aggregate green production per dollar in country i.
Proof of lemma 1:
By de¯nition,
i i i i ° i °¡1@X @− N e ¡ 1 (2¡ °)(e ) ¡ 2 + °(e )
= p(1) = p(1) > 0
i i + i ° i °@e @e b (e ) ¡ 1 (e ) ¡ 1
if ° < 2.
Proof of Proposition 4:
i i s1. Since X is increasing in e from lemma 1, Southern market share s is thus increasing inp
ie as well. Part 1 of the proposition thus follows from routine di®erentiation of equation (14),
0 iprovided that M (e ) is not too large.
i2. From equation (13), and the de¯nition of − above, we have
i 0 i@p(1) 1 @X ® M (e ))
= ¡ ¡ < 0;
i n s i n s@e 2(− + − ) @e 2¡ ® − + −
i iif (@X =@e )j > 0; or from lemma 1, if ° < 2.p(1)const:
Proof of Proposition 5:
y i 1Let Á , Á and Á , respectively be the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the market
clearance equations for the homogenenous numeraire, eco-friendly output produced in country
u Li and the eco-unfriendly output respectively. Also let Á and Á be the Lagrangian multipliers
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n n n¹respectively associated with U(D ; d ) ¸ U and the material balance equation (14).x y
The ¯rst order conditions for consumption allocations are given by:
s nU Ui i u i i®e ¡ Á = Á ®e ¡ Á = 0; i = n; s;
s nD Dx x
s nU U1 u 1® ¡ Á = Á ® ¡ Á = 0;
s nD Dx x
s nU U1 u 1® ¡ Á = Á ® ¡ Á = 0;
s nD Dx x
s nU Uy u y(1¡ ®) ¡ Á = Á (1¡ ®) ¡ Á = 0:
s nd dy y
In addition, the ¯rst order conditions for producer allocations are:
i 1 i i ° y~Á ¡ Á ¡ b ((~e ) ¡ 1)Á = 0; i = n; s;e
1 i y~Á ¡ b Á = 0:1
Finally, the Pareto Optimal labeling standard satis¯es:Z i~s n beU U Ns i u n i y i °¡1®d (e ) + Á ®d (e ) Á ( )°(e ) bdb = 0:x xs n +D D b 0x x
i i iThe four sets of conditions in Proposition 3 are thus obtained by recalling that ¼ = (®=D )(d =(1¡x y
®)).
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Table 1
Country Seal Mandatory / Gov't / Year No. of Used in
Voluntary Non- Founded Product Retail
Gov't Categories Products
Austria Austrian Eco-Label Voluntary Gov't 1991 35 Yes
Brazil ABNT Voluntary Quasi 1993 2 Yes
Canada Environmental Choice Voluntary Quasi 1988 49 Yes
China Ecomark Voluntary Gov't 1994 12 Yes
Croatia Croatia's Environmental Voluntary Gov't 1993 33 Yes
Label
Czech Rep. { Voluntary Gov't 1994 17 Yes
Nordic Nordic Swan Voluntary Quasi 1989 42 Yes
Countries
EU European Union Voluntary Gov't 1992 11 Yes
Ecolabel Award Scheme
France NF-Environment Voluntary Gov't 1992 6 Yes
Germany Blue Angel Voluntary Gov't 1977 88 Yes
Germany Green Dot Voluntary Quasi 1990 7 Yes
India Ecomark Voluntary Gov't 1991 16 Yes
Indonesia BAPEDAL Voluntary Gov't 1995 n.a. n.a.
Japan Ecomark Voluntary Quasi 1989 69 Yes
Korea Ecomark Voluntary Gov't 1992 36 Yes
Malaysia Product Certi¯cation Voluntary Gov't 1996 1 Yes
Program
Netherlands Stichting Mileukeur Voluntary Quasi 1992 32 Yes
New Zealand Environmental Choice Voluntary Quasi 1990 17 Yes
Singapore Green Label Voluntary Gov't 1992 21 Yes
Thailand Thai Green Label Voluntary Gov't 1993 6 Yes
U.S. Energy Star Voluntary Quasi 1992 26 Yes
Source: WTO (2000).
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Table 2. Simulation Results
Status Quo Pareto Optimal Nash Equilibrium
(% change from (% change from)
status quo) status quo)
Labeling Standards
South 1.00000 43.40000 35.00000
North 1.00000 43.40000 50.80000
Price Response
Eco-unfriendly
South 1.00000 -14.26301 -14.15364
North 1.00000 -14.26301 -14.15364
Price Response
Eco-friendly
South 1.00000 29.13699 20.84636
North 1.00000 29.13699 36.64636
Price Response
Eco-friendly
South 1.00000 29.13699 20.84636
North 1.00000 29.13699 36.64636
Price Response
Eco-friendly
South 1.00000 29.13699 20.84636
North 1.00000 29.13699 36.64636
Trade Volume
South 0.70000 0.00000 -6.43219
North 0.70000 0.00000 -6.43219
Producer Pro¯ts
South 0.50000 -0.90831 -5.47921
North 0.50000 -0.90831 3.54619
National Welfare
South 1.50000 0.00329 -0.25719
North 8.50000 2.57458 2.51929
Joint 10.0000 2.18889 2.10282
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Figure 1. Nash Equilibrium and Pareto Optimal Labeling Standards
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